Monday, July 24, 2006

B'nos Tz'lofchod

Last Shabbos, my friend David F. asked me how I understood the dikduk of the following passuk (Bamidbar 36:6):

זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר-צִוָּה יְהוָה, לִבְנוֹת צְלָפְחָד לֵאמֹר, לַטּוֹב בְּעֵינֵיהֶם, תִּהְיֶינָה לְנָשִׁים: אַךְ, לְמִשְׁפַּחַת מַטֵּה אֲבִיהֶם--תִּהְיֶינָה לְנָשִׁים.

"This is the matter which HaShem has commanded regarding the daughters of Tz'lofchod, saying: Let them be married to whom they think best; only into the family of the tribe of their father shall they be married".

The issue that he brought up was how the verse uses the masculine possessive term "בְּעֵינֵיהֶם" to refer to the b'nos Tz'lofchod.

Shortly before, I had been browsing through the Oznayim LaTorah, and noted that he also asked this question, answering regarding the importance of not relying too much on one's own opinion in deciding on a proper shidduch, as strong feelings of love can blind one towards problems that a third party would see. Even though the b'nos Tz'lofchod did not have a father, nor brothers, they should still seek out the advice of others before making their decision. This idea is expressed by the usage of the masculine term, rather than the feminine one. ad can tamzis d'varav.

Even if one uses the answer of the Oznayim LaTorah, though, one still can ask about the usage of the masculine term "אֲבִיהֶם" at the end of the verse. The simple answer that I wanted to give is that the Torah doesn't always care about proper grammar. We also see masculine pronouns used to refer to the B'nos Tz'lofchod in 27:7:

כֵּן, בְּנוֹת צְלָפְחָד דֹּבְרֹת--נָתֹן תִּתֵּן לָהֶם אֲחֻזַּת נַחֲלָה, בְּתוֹךְ אֲחֵי אֲבִיהֶם; וְהַעֲבַרְתָּ אֶת-נַחֲלַת אֲבִיהֶן, לָהֶן.

"The daughters of Tz'lofchod speak right; you shall surely give them a possession of an inheritance amongst their father's brothers, and you shall pass on the inheritance of their father to them.

This verse is particularly interesting in that it starts out with the masculine "לָהֶם" and "אֲבִיהֶם", but then changes over to the feminine "אֲבִיהֶן" and "לָהֶן". As a further data point, the nun at the end of the word "מִשְׁפָּטָן" in 27:5 is written large, which may or may not have significance to the discussion at hand.

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Monday, July 17, 2006

Mas'ei 1 - Elidad and Kemu'el

According to the Midrash Tanchuma in P' Beha'alos'cha, the new nesi'im of the tribes of Binyamin and Ephrayim, Elidad ben Kislon and Kemu'el ben Shiftan respectively, were actually Eldad and Meidad, the men who did not respond to Moshe's invitation to take part in a lottery to determine who would become the 70 zekeinim, but who became nevi'im nonetheless (and apparently nesi'im, even). How can this be understood in light of the statement in last week's parsha (26:64) that no man who was part of the census of Moshe and Aharon was part of the census of Moshe and Elazar (besides Yehoshua and Kaleiv)?

The Oznayim LaTorah (ibid.) asks the same question regarding Machir and Yair b'nei Menashe, and quotes the Rashba in Tosfos on B.B. 117, who says that the verse refers only to those who should have rightfully died due to the decree of the spies by virtue of their being of military age, such as Kaleiv, who was 40 at the time (Yehoshua 14:7) and Yehoshua, who was 44 at the time (as calculated from his age at death of 110 (ibid. 24:29) less his reign of 28 years and less the 38 years of sojourning in the desert), while Machir and Ya'ir were by now much older, as they were alive during Ya'akov's lifetime, so therefore were not included in the decree.
A similar answer could be given for Eldad and Meidad, that by the time that they were appointed to be zekeinim, they were also beyond the age of 60, so therefore were not included in the decree.

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Saturday, March 25, 2006

Vayak'heil-Pekudei - Thoughts from Shabbos

1) Why in 37:29 is the Shemen HaMishchah referred to as "kodesh" while the K'tores is referred to as "tahor", as opposed to vice versa? (credit: Sam)

My immediate reaction was to recall a sugya that I saw in Menachos (96b) earlier this week in which the description "tahor" as applied to the shulchan of the Mishkan teaches us that it is m'kabeil tum'a (the gemara's initial thought is that it not be, since it is an immobile wooden object, although it resolves the problem by explaining that they would bring the shulchan out to show the olei r'galim the warm bread on it, so it was not actually immobile). The only way that incense could be m'kabeil tum'a would seem to be through tum'as ochlim, and only a handful of the spices are edible (according to Wikipedia: cassia, saffron, costus and cinnamon - perhaps also spikenard, which apparently has medicinal purposes - does that qualify?), so perhaps one could apply a similar idea to the k'tores, that all of it be m'kabeil tum'a. The shemen ha-mishchah would not need such a d'rasha, since all of the spices are immersed in the olive oil, which is m'kabeil tum'a, so really have no identity on their own (Perhaps one could also attribute it to an issue of rov, where rov of the k'tores is not m'kabeil tum'a while rov of the shemen ha-mishchah is? What would the halacha be for a regular mixture of edible and inedible spices used for fragrance?)

Of course, I don't think that we would be able to make such a drasha on our own, but it would be interesting if such is, indeed, the halacha.

A cursory glance at the m'farshim produced the S'forno, who says that "tahor" means that the spices of the k'tores must be pure from any impurities - and this adjective is also applied to it in P' Ki Tisa. The question would still remain, though: why only the k'tores and not the oil? S'forno also comments that kodesh by the oil means "bilti nifsad", in the sense of "It should be holy to Me for your generations in P' Ki Tisa" - but I don't understand what this means.

Chizkuni explains "tahor" that the incense requires purity, and quotes the passuk of "Dead flies putrify the perfumer's oil" (Koheles 10:2) to prove his point. I am ignorant, also, of how this verse specifically applies to the incense, and not the oil.

Alternatively, one could answer that "tahor" as describing the k'tores is juxtaposed to the oil, so that it applies to both - this would answer the questions on both of the m'farshim's comments, as well as eliminating the need for any explanation of the differentiation between the two. The gemara says in several places that the concept of hekeish is d'oraissa, but I think that we still need a mesorah in order to invoke a hekeish.

The opposite question, regarding why only the oil is called kodesh is not a question, as the incense is also called kodesh, in P' Ki Tisa.

2) Pekudei is one of the 5 parshiyos in the first four chumashim that do not start with a vav ha-chibbur. The others are Bereishis, Noach, and - interestingly - B'chukosai and Mas'ei. The significance to this tidbit is dependent on who is responsible for our system of parsha divisions. It would be interesting if the three aforementioned sets were the most often doubled up, so that we had parshiyos starting without a vav ha-chibbur as seldom as possible, but this is not the case (IIRC, T-M and/or A-K are doubled more frequently that V-P). Perhaps Bereishis and Noach are just too long to double up (they would even dwarf this week's gargantuan leining).

3) Did anyone else think about R' Nosson Kaminetzky and R' Slifkin while listening to today's haftarah reading? Granted, Yechezkeil's (near-)ban was a bit different, in that it was being done over 500 years following his death (as indicated by the fact that Chananya ben Chizkiyah ben Garon, one of the students of Shammai, successfully defended against it). One can ask why specifically the Rabbis of that generation felt the need to put it in genizah when their predecessors did not, but precedents do exist - 2 of them by Chizkiyahu in the 4th perek of Pesachim.

Addendum (transferred from my comments section): R' Moshe Feinstein touches on the issue of the ban on Yechezkeil in one of his pieces about the peirush on chumash attributed to R' Yehuda HaChassid (whose authenticity he speaks out very strongly against), explaining that, despite the prohibition against stifling a nevuah, Chazal saw that there was a good rationale for doing so, in the case of Yechezkeil. I didn't read it so closely, but, IIRC, it's in the 2nd or 3rd volume of Igros Moshe, Yoreh Dei'ah.

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