Kohanim in Cars in Cemeteries

A poster on a discussion list, commenting on a psak a few years ago by R' Zev Cohen that it's prohibited for kohanim to travel along a certain block of W. Pratt Ave. in Chicago because of trees that overshadow a Jewish cemetery and one side of the street, wondered why the car would not insulate the kohen. Another poster suggested that perhaps the prohibition is only if one were walking, or if a window was open.

According to the Rambam, Hil. TM 20:1, there are only three things that can protect against tum'a transmitted by an ohel: Tzamid p'sil, Ohalin, and Belu'in.

Acc. to Ch. 21, Tzamid p'sil (a tight seal - which would be negated by an open window) only works by earthenware vessels or, by extension, vessels that are susceptible to tum'a at all. Hence, this would not work for most cars, except perhaps the ones that are made of plastic. The protection of ohel b'soch ohel (a tent in a tent) would not work because a moving car constitutes an ohel zaruk (movable tent) that is not halachically considered an ohel (11:5/6), while the hatzalah of balu'a (swallowed object) only works for something inside a living creature (20/5:6).

Hence, I don't see how being in a moving car would prevent a kohen from becoming tamei. Are any of these restrictions subject to machlokes?

Update, 7/20: There are numerous fascinating articles on the issue of kohanim in airplanes available online, including this one by R' Daniel Wolf of Yeshivat Har Etzion and an article in Tradition by R' JD Bleich (only available to subscribers). To summarize a few points: The Rashba paskens like the opinion on Eruvin 33b which says that an ohel zaruk is a valid ohel, but Rambam and Tosefos argue. The P'nei Yehoshua and Shevus Yaakov hold that even the opinion which says that it's not an ohel zaruk is only based on a rabbinical decree, so that there would be a basis to be lenient in a case of doubt, but there wouldn't seem to be any doubt to base such a leniency on. There's also an interesting discussion regarding whether or not the aluminum that comprises the bulk of most planes is m'kabel tum'a (machlokes Rashi and Rambam regarding whether the list of metals in this week's parsha is exhaustive) and, were aluminum not to be m'kabel tum'a, whether the steel bolts, rivets, etc. that hold together the plane (ma'amid) would still render it m'kabel tum'a and whether the plane's seal satisfies the requirements of tzamid p'sil.


Update, 7/23: Another poster asked if cars would be exempted from the laws of tum'a because they are keilim ha-ba'im b'middah, vessels which are larger than 40 sei'ah in volume (3 cubic amos), and hence are considered to be immobile.

K'li ha-ba'ah b'midah (aka k'li he-asui l'nachas - a vessel intended to be stationary) is only a law by wood, hide, or cloth, as is learned out from a juxtaposition to a sack (which is intended to be movable even when full) in Vayikra 11:32 - see Chagiga 26b and Rambam Hil. Keilim 3:2 and 3:3.

RJDBleich in his article on airplanes that I previously mentioned (Tradition 36:4) mentions several other reasons why this heter would not apply to a vehicle, including that it has wheels (so is movable) and that it is used for seating (as excepted by Tos' Shabbos 44b DH Mucheni).

Yehoshua 20 - Arei Miklat

In the chapter 19, Yehoshua concluded dividing the land amongst the tribes. In chapter 20, the Cities of Refuge for negligent murderers are designated. Yehoshua designated the three cities in Israel proper - Kedesh in the north, Shechem in the heartland, and Chevron in the south - and activated the three cities that Moshe had designated in Transjordan - Betzer in the south, Ramos in the central region, and Golan in the north.

The commentators discuss why the two disparate sides of the Jordan river were allocated an equal number of Cities of Refuge. Rashi (Bamidbar 35:14), quoting Makkos 10a, learns out from pesukim in Hoshei'a that Gil'ad - here apparently used to refer to Transjordan as a unit - was a land in which murder was more prevalent. Ramban (ibid.) suggests that this could either be a form of prophetic foreknowledge of the future or an acknowledgement that something about the land - perhaps its status as something of a frontier-country - made murders more likely.

Ramban deals with the objection that Cities of Refuge only worked for accidental murders, not willful ones, by suggesting that the murderers of Gil'ad tried to make their murders look accidental. Da'as Z'keinim notes the ma'amar on Makkos 10b describing a form of Divine justice in which one who accidentally kills without witnesses and one who purposefully kills without witnesses would happen to come to the same place where it would be brought about that the accidentally murderer would accidentally kill the purposeful murderer with witnesses, so that both parties would get what they deserved. Chizkuni points out that according to Makkos 9b, both accidental and purposeful murderers were exiled to the Cities of Refuge, from whence they would be retrieved and judged with the proper punishment.

Ramban alternatively suggests that the reason why Transjordan was alloted more cities was because of its greater land area.

Divrei Yirmiyahu

Last year, Josh Waxman at parshablog made an interesting post (which he reposted this year) in which he suggests that Yirmiyahu's complaint "Lo yadati dabeir ki na'ar anochi" - "I cannot speak, for I am a child" is not merely a figurative statement that, because he is young and from the countryside, he does not have the necessary speaking skills needed to be a prophet, but rather it is a literal statement that he is physically unable to speak - in other words, that is a young infant who is physically unable to speak. See there for the full post.

In a comment there, I provided both an additional support and an attack on his contention. On the one hand, Yalkut Shim'oni Yirmiyahu 1:262 mentions a prophecy that Yirmiyahu delivered immediately after his birth:

"My mother! You have not conceived me like the normal way of women, and you did not bear me like the normal way of childbearing women. Perhaps you are like a wayward woman, and you have set your eyes upon another man, like a Sotah? Why do you not drink the accursed waters of the Sotah? You have been very brazen!"

When his mother protested her newborn son's false accusations (especially in light of that he shouldn't be speaking at all at this age), he responds that he is referring to Tzion and Yerushalayim, not to her, his physical mother.

Hence, we see a Midrashic source which supports the possibility that Yirmiyahu's call to prophecy was when he was in utero (as opposed to his merely being designated as such at that time, as in v. 5).

However, I'm not sure how well this reading of the verse in Yirmiyah works. My impression is that the word na'ar refers more to a lad or a teenager - examples of the word's usage include Yishma'el (at age 14, when he was sent away by Avraham) and Yosef (at age 17). The word is used by Moshe when he was found by Bas-Par'o (Sh'mos 2:6 - va-tiftach va-tir'eihu es ha-yeled v'hinei na'ar bocheh), but there, Rashi comments on the strange usage of the word, and explains that, while he was only a yeled, his cries were stronger, like those of a na'ar; this implies that the word usually refers to an older child.

I do not have a concordance handy (is there a good Hebrew one online?), but one possible argument against this contention of mine is Yeshaya 7:16: "For before the lad knows to reject evil and choose good, the land which you fear shall be abandoned of its two kings". Here, it would seem that na'ar can also refer to a very young child, although it would seem to still be one who is able to talk.

Update: In a response to my comment, Josh W. quoted the Ramban on the above verse in Shmos, who brings several clear proofs that na'ar, indeed, can refer to a newborn child, as well as to an older child.